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For the last several centuries, the concept of modemity has fumished political 
philosophy and p이 itical science with an orientation toward the world that 
accepted modem natural science as the model for inquiry, and freedom as the 
governing norm of political life. Postmodernists often present themselves as 
enemles 이 modernity but are, 1 argue, simply more sophisticated modemists -
they 떼ect the modem devotion to scientific enlightenment as the only p삶h to 
truth, but they retain an unexamined commitment to freedom as the central 
political norm and to democracy as the only legitimate political ∞mmunity. The 
Neo-Aristotelian naturalism 1 propose is not a new paradigm, but a way of 
thinking about the modernist and postmodernist paradigms we have too often 
accepted as inevitable. It is critical rather than programmatic or doctrinal. What 1 
am after here is a way of thinking about what we are doing that is open to 
critique and revision in a way that modernism and postmodernism are not. 
Keywords: modernism, postmodernism, neo-Aristotelianism, paradigm, 
endoxa 
Very soon after the historian of physical sciεnce πlomas Kuhn introduced the term in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s, the idea of a ‘'paradigm" quickly became recognized an essential 
feature of every well-organized and mature academic discipline (Kuhn 1970). Ever 
since that time, academic political science has been engaged in perpetual controversy 
over what, if any, paradigm we should adopt to achieve scholarly maturity on a par with 
the natural sciences, and with some of the other social sciences, notably Eεonomics and 
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Cultural Anthropology. Kuhn ’s philosophical critics immediately pointed out the 
없nbiguity of the term “paradigm" (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970), noting that it seemed 
refer not only to a method of inquiry, but to a set of well-respected historical examples 
as well as to a basic worldview or set of presuppositions about 此 o비ect of inquiry that 
underlies and supports the work of any distinctive and well-organized community of 
scholars. Nonetheless, the idea that a unifying Kuhnian paradigm is a necessity for any 
respectable discipline took hold with astonishing rapidity, especially in the social 
sciences,l) and within these especi떠Iy in Political Science, and it is not hard to see why. 
Over the past 35 years, the complaint has been raised over and over that not only is 
Political Science composed of so many different approaches and research traditions, but 
also that many of these approaches are themselves so unmethodical, so undisciplined, in 
comparison with those of other academic departments. As rational choice advocate 
Kenneth Shepsle put it in 1990: “ Is there a core in contempor따Y poli디cal science? ... 
there are pockets of discipline within the profession. But for the most part, the discipline 
is undisciplined" (Monroe et al. 1990). More recently, the very same complaint is voiced 
by David Laitin, who argues that we must sett1e on a single idea of “ disciplinary 
organization" (he proposes one such) that “ puts constraints on the assumptions, the 
reasoning, and the empirical claims that are permissible" in Political Sciencε or else risk 
“ institutional incoherence" and loss of scientific or scholarly status (Laitin 2004, 11-
40).2) πlÎs soft of quasi-permanent paradigm anxiety seεms to reflect not only concems 
1) Kuhn himself referred to the socia1 sciences as “ pre-paradigmatic'’ (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970, 
244-245). 
2) Laitin’s approach is attacked in that volume, and he vigorously defends it against further anti-
paradigm critiques in a recent issue of the jouma1 The Good Society 15, No. 1 (2006). Two recent 
interesting works attacking the attachment to the pr이ect of establishing a coherent unifying 
paradigm of the sort Laitin proposes are Shapiro 2005 , and Norton 2004. Both Shapiro and Norton 
resist what they see as a pemicious, unnecessarily restrictive drift toward disciplinarity as an end in 
itself. For Shapiro, a sεIf-dεscribed pragmatist, the work of social science in general should be 
govemed by an attεmpt to use whatever tools are handy to clarify and solvε problεms that εmεrgε m 
contemporary society. For Norton, a postmodemist, the explanations proposed by any inquiry 
(wh앉her it calls itself scientific or not) are simply stories or narrativεs， and the more the better. 
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about how Political Scientists should best pursue truth, but a deep worry about the very 
survival of Political Sciεnce within the academy. 
My argument in this paper is that the solution to our dilemma resides neither in the 
adoption of a uniform paradigm, nor in the r망ection of the value of Kuhnian paradigms 
as such. If we understand such paradigms as widely held, plausible, but nonetheless 
criticizable beliefs that inform inquiry in various disciplines or communities of learning 
and action, they seem to be advantageous in at least two ways - they make research 
and teaching much more efficient by allowing members of a discipline to avoid always 
having to st따t from scratch and invent their own approach to a field of study, and they 
make possiblε communication among those who share a paradigm. But such paradigms 
bring with them a certain disadvantage or cost: they tend to obstruct reflective inquiry 
into the basic principles of a discipline and thus make serious scholarship less 
philosophical and self-critical.3l My goal here is not to propose a new paradigm for 
Political Science that will offer the benefits without the costs - 1 think that is 
impossible - but instead to out1ine a Neo-Aristotelian way of thinking about what we 
are doing as Political Scientists that can preserve the benefits of shared paradigms while 
avoiding the tendency of paradigm-talk to restrict self-critical reflection and make the 
discipline less philosophical and less open to a variety of ideas and approaches than it 
needs to be. 
To begin with, 1 want to take notice of a fairly obvious truth. In spite of the continuing 
proliferation of subfields in the discipline, there are not an infinite number of paradigms 
in contemporary Political Sciεnce， but two major ones in direct competition with onε 
another: a variable-centered political science that explicit1y adopts the model of modem 
scientific predictive explanation as its paradigm, and an interpretive political science that 
r에ects this scientific model and proceeds instead to examine the significance of 
3) These advantages and disadvantages were recognized by two philosophical German practitioners of 
the human sciences at the end of the 19th centuη - by Nietzsche who was quite critical of the 
newly emerging disciplines, and by Max Weber, who understood the critique and thought there was 
no way to avoid the blinders imposed by joining a scholarly discipline but nevertheless argued for 
embracing “ science as a vocation" in spite of it. 
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particular societies and polities on the model of reading a literary text in order to bring 
out its coherence anφor incoherence.4) Both paradigms have extεnsive following among 
contemporary p이itical scientists, and both have led to a number of important and 
illuminating studies. Clearly, each captures something of real importance about the 
character of modem political life. My quarrel is not with the body of work modem 
political science has produced, but with the narrow understanding of the basis for that 
work embodied in the self-consciousness of the two competing paradigms. 
To characterize these two competing research traditions, 1 suggest replacing the term 
“ paradigm" with a word from Aristotle’s Greek vocabulary, the term endoxa.5) My 
reason for suggesting this is that unlike Kuhn’s “ paradigm," Aristotlε’ s term endoxa 
doesn ’ t describe a set of presuppositions that must be taken for granted if any 
authoritative inquiη is to go forward (no paradigm, no science - any practice of 
inquiry that lacks a strong widely and tacitly accepted paradigm is defective and “pre-
scientific"), but a set of opinions about basic matters that are indeed useful and 
compelling and productive, but not to be taken as beyond question and critique. The 
Aristotelian approach here, as in other areas both theoretical and practical, is an attempt 
to escape two unsatisfactory but alluring εxtremes: the belief that inquiry works only 
when its presuppositions are safe from questioning, and the belief that inquiry proceeds 
bεst when it r엠ects presuppositions aItogethεr.6) Both of these “ vices" of inquiry can be 
4) The classic defense ofthis interpretive approach against the natural scientific model is Taylor 1971 , 
reprinted in Rabinow and Sullivan 1987, 33-8 1. For an extensive argument that attempts to show 
that interpretive political science is best understood as informal preparation for scientific variable-
centered analysis, see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994. 
5) That is, answers that are prominent and widespread in the Greek culture he and his students share: 
‘Thε εnduλ:1.1 are opinions about how things seem that arε hεId by all or by thε many or by the wise 
- that is, by all the wise, or by the many among them, or by the most notable (gnôrimoi) and 
endoxic (endoxoi, most famous) ofthεm." Topics 1 OOb2lff. The fact that Aristotle identifies a belief 
as res야cted does not imply that he finds it respectablε. His distance 삼om the endoxa, likε Plato’s, is 
signaled by the fact that each avoids using words 1ike gnôrimos (notable) and kalosk ’agathos 
(gent1eman) as terms of genuine praise, referring instead the 1ess familiar spoudaios (serious) and 
epieikês (equitable, decent). 
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traced to the broader phenomenon of modemism, as it originates in the philosophical 
debates in Europe in the 17th century. More must be said about this, but my general 
claim is that in order to understand the intellectual power of and the opposition between 
the variable-centered and the interpretive paradigms, it is necessary to see them as 
flowing from two different forms of philosophical modemism. Th얹e two modernisms 
- the mechanistic materialism proposed by Hobbes and othεrs in the 17th century, and 
the culturalist response to that modemism that begins with Rousseau ’s 18th century 
reaction against 17th century materialism - form the necessary background for 
assessing both the strengths and the limitations of contemporary political science. My 
argument wil\ be that both of these phi1osophical modemisms and the post-modemism 
that succeeds them at the end of the 19th century are defective in that each claims to 
know more than it can possibly know. By claiming that it and it alone can serve as the 
theoretical background for empirical inquiry in the human sciences, each serves to 
defeat the possibility of philosophically informed inquiry in political science, and thus 
gives us to reason to think about Neo-Aristotelian altematives . 
In what follows , 1 provide a quick narrative of how we arrived at our current situation 
by looking at four different ways of understanding the world and the place of human 떼d 
political life in that world. 1 begin with the medieval European Biblical worldview 
against which modemism and the Enlightenment arose, and follow with the two 
modemisms and finally with postmodemism. My contention is that each chapter in the 
story involvεs a claim to exclusive and complete possession of the truth about the 
whole, claims that have forcε but cannot be established with certainty. My conclusion is 
that these perspectives all involve partial truths that can best be organized and 
6) John Searle, in his Mind, lμnguage and Society: Philosophy in the Real World, uses the computer 
metaphor of “ default positions" to refer to “ the views that we hold prereflectively so that any 
departure from them requires a conscious effort and a convincing argument‘’ (Searle 1988, 9). 1 think 
Searle’s default position metaphor c1arifies our relationship to our basic presuppositions much more 
accurately than Kuhn ’ S “ paradigm" or, for that matter, Nietzsche ’ s “ horizon" does. Such 
presuppositions are usually accepted tacitly, but with effort they are accessiblε to us for reflection 
and even revision 
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understood from a more inclusive and less dogmatic Neo-Aristotelian picture of the 
world political science seeks to understand?J 
1) 까le Bible presents the cosmos as the creation of God. The fundamental unity of all 
nature is more pronounced than it is for Aristotle, whose primary concem is with the 
manyness of beings and with the character of the Întemal beginning or source (archê) 
that distinguishes each from the rest. Aristotle ’s “ primary instance of being" , the 
unmoved mover, is a model for all the rest, but not their master or creator. On the 
Biblical understanding , created, sensible nature has a definite duration in time, 
dependent upon its supersensible creator, and calls for interpretation as a whole in this 
way. Beings are not self-moving, but owe their existence to God. We are radically 
different from the rest of nature in that we are capable of free will, and hence of 
resistance to God and the divine will. For Aristotle, voluntary motion is an attribute of 
all living beings, not humans alone. The central practical questions for human beings, 
according to the Biblical model, involve our relations to the creator on the one hand and 
the rest 0 1' creation on the other. Since most 0 1' the Islarnic, Jewish, and Christian writers 
in this ontological tradition had to face the question of its compatibility with an 
Aristotεlian or Platonic model, they had continuously to con1'ront the possibility 0 1' 
conflict between philosophical and theological truths, between revelation and reason. In 
terms 0 1' an Aristotεlian distinction between inquiry into necessity and inquiry into 
meaning, the crεation model represents the triumph 0 1' meaning over necessity. 
2) The modem sciεntific model 0 1' the whole as a coherent al1-inclusive machine, a 
world of matter in law-govemed motion without purpose. Originating in the 17th 
century, this has been the dominant view within natural science since that time. It 
represεnts the exclusion 0 1' inquiries into meaning from scientific discourse, or rational 
discoursε generally, in 1'avor of inquiriεs into necessity. Questions about meaning and 
7) 1 say “ Neo-Aristotelian" rather than simply “ Aristotelian" not because of any particular 
disagreement with Aristotle’s ontology or metaphysics (though no one could now accept it in every 
respect), but because the position 1 outline here is a response to post-Aristotelian perspectives that 
Aristotle himself could not have contemplated. My belief is that 1 am extending Aristotle’s basic 
ideas, Ilot bringing him “ up to date." 
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value are not referable to nature, and any attempt to do so is condernned as 뻐perstItlOn， 
the inappropriate intrusion of religion into matters of scientific inquiry. Aristotle is 
consistently identified as one of the champions of superstition (by Hobbes especially), 
and his teleology is one of the prime obstacles to valid scientific inquiry, which must 
always be concemed with discovering the necessary laws that govem the motion of 
matter, something that is now identified with nature as such. 
3) The Kantian model of the whole as essentially dual, composed of two radically 
different kinds of being: the mechanical nature of modem science, plus a separate 
supersensible realm or system of free and rational determinations. Unlike the creation 
model, the supersensible realm of freedom here emerges spontaneously from and stands 
in opposition to the natural machine. No miracle is required to produce and sustain the 
realm of freedom. All that is required is a powerful wi11 to resist our natural inclinations 
and act according to our duty as rational beings. In a sense, Kant is saying to mechanists 
like Hobbes and Locke that they didn ’t go far enough in removing meaning from nature, 
since they sti11 hang on to the notion that nature may teach us a law we can use to govem 
ourselves well, even if it contains no hint of a highest good. Kant ’s thesis of the 
separation of rational freedom and nature is itself modified, and the antitheses eventually 
reconciled in the historicism of Hegε1 and Marx, according to whom human history is 
the unintentional but inevitably progressive overcoming of natural resistance by human 
freedom and reason. 만1Ìs dualist tradition as a whole n1ight be described as humanist: it 
offers the possibility of intεgrating necessity and meaning within human activity, 
without any reference needed to a creator god. Aristotle’s naturalism is doubly excluded 
by tl1is perspective: his teleology prεvεnts him from understanding natural necessity, and 
his failure to see that rationality requires freedom from nature blinds him to the 
profundity of human creativity.8) 
8) Some contemporary defenders of philosophical modernism argue that modernity as a set of 
historical transforrnations is so different from what preceded it that no earlier mode of thought is 
adequate to understanding our lives as modern people. One of the strongest prl얘onents of this view 
is Charles Taylor. He sets out his case for the uniqueness of modernity most clearly in Taylor 2004. 1 
find more persuasive an argument made by Bernard Yack that theoretical modernism so exaggerates 
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4) The postmodem position 따ticulated most intluentially by Nietzsche, according to 
which the whole is only a “ whole" in quotation marks, simply a fiction or a myth or a 
“soci띠 construction" that owes its persistence not to its truth but to the interests it serves. 
As Kant claims to go beyond Hobbes and Hume, and Hegel and Marx beyond Kant, so 
Nietzsche claims to push the modem project beyond humanism altogether - to undo 
what Kant cal1ed his “Copemican revolution," his placement of human being (rather 
than nature or the gods) at the center of philosophic inquiry. The central insight of 
postmodemism is negative: the rejection of the idea that there is, in Iris Murdoch ’s 
words , some “ unconditional element in the structure of reason and reality. ,,9) 
Postmodemism thus presents itself not as one among several possible answers to the 
question of the character of the whole, but as a thoroughgoing rejection of the 
philosophical tradition organized around that question. For Nietzsche, the human 
attempt to impose meaning on meaningless nature lO) is inevitable but never final. 
and “ fetishizes" its own distinctiveness and unity that it is unable to understand adequately a number 
of very important features of modem politics, nationalism and liberal constitutionalism among them. 
See Yack 1997. See also Yack‘ s review of Modem Social lmaginaries in Ethics. 
9) 까IÎs phrase is Iris Murdoch ’s, Metaphysics As A Guide η Morals (Murdoch 1993, 432). In this 
work, as in her Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch argues that morality needs metaphysical guidance; 
that the substance of metaphysics is not a rule or principle, but an image of our expεrience of 
perfεction (one that announces that it is an image); and that the function of this image is not to 
supply a foundation for morals or to issue answers to moral and political problems, but to provide an 
orienting light in terms of which viπues and choices make sense: “The Form of the Good, herein like 
Kant’s call of duty, may be seen as enlightening particular scenes and setting the specialised moral 
virtues and insights into their required particular pattems. This is how the phenomena are saved and 
thep때iculars redeemed, in this light. Plato’s Good resembles Kant’s Reason, but is a better image, 
since, by contrast, reason too, if we are to keep any force in the concept, is a speci때ised instrument. 
Thε sovereign Good is not an empty recεptacle into which the arbitrary will places 0비ects of its 
choice. It is something which we all experience as a creative force. ηlis is metaphysics, which sets 
up a picture which it then offers as an appeal to us all to see if we cannot find just this in our deepest 
experience. The word ‘deep,’ or some such metaphor, wiU come in here as p따t of the essence of the 
appeal. In this respect metaphysical and religious pictures resemble each other" (Murdoch 1993, 
507, italics in text). 
10) Even “ necessity" is simply a meaning imposed by humans upon “nature." Nietzsche, BGE, Part 1. 
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Aristot1e is to be rejected both for thinking that there is meaning in nature, and for 
thinking that thεre is pεrmanent or even stable meaning anywhere. Later 
postmodernists, like Heidegger, criticize Nietzsche for not going far enough in 
overcoming this philosophical delusion. And not surprisingly, recent writers deeply 
influenced by Heidegger attempt to “ go beyond" him in the same emancipatory 
direction. The end of this trail of 깨upersession" (the post-Hegelian way of saying 
“ absorbing and going beyond") seems to be not a new metaphysic, but an embrace of 
disciplinarity, which reminds us that philosophy is only one scholarly specialty among 
many in the contemporary research university. So long as it is successful in maintaining 
its departmental status within the university, no more justification is needed than in the 
case of any other such specialty. ll) 
These four “waves,, 12) of Westem philosophic reflection have swamped Aristot1e’s 
metaphysics beneath a formidable tide of disparate rejections. And yet we must 
reconsider his metaphysics if we are to think about his conception of political science, 
since idea of politics makes little sense without the teleological background in which 
Aristot1e places it. In particular we have to consider Aristot1e’s idea that nature (and not 
humanity or the supematural) is the primary site of both necessity and meaning. We 
11) Nietzsche already recognized and dεp10red this trεnd in the German universities of the 1870’ s. S∞ 
Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life and On the Future of Our Educational Institutions: 
Homer and Classical Phi/ology. But very much the same triumph of disciplinarity as needing no 
further justification is celebrated by a genuinely postmodem social scientist, Max Weber, in 
“ Science as a Vocation." Nietzsche and Weber deplore and praise the triumph of disciplinarity in 
prlεcisely the same moral terms: for Nietzsche, it is a sign of great weakness and a perversion of the 
modem “ historica\ sεnse，" for Weber of great strength - for each, as for Kant이 strength of will or 
character is the highest virtue. 
12) The reader will note that this periodization of post-ancient Westem political philosophy into a 
medieval foJlowed by three modem “waves" is taken 1없gely from Leo Strauss’s essay, “What Is 
Political Philosophy" (Strauss 1959, 9-55).1 differ from Strauss, however, in thinking that ancient 
political philosophy is not an espεcially unifiεd point of view. 까1e position 1 defend in this essay is 
Aristotelian, and 1 would say Platonic as well, but beyond that 1 do not think any other m매or ancient 
thinker would endorsε 1t. 까lUS 1 am not advocating the blanket supe끼ority of the “ ancients" to the 
“ modems." 
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cannot expect clear evidence of the superior plausibility of Aristotle ’s metaphysical 
understanding to the four others sketched above, but we can surely begin with the 
currently reputable (or “ endoxic") opinion that each of the other responses to the 
question of metaphysics has considerable difficulties of its own. At least in that respect, 
the intellectual climate (or, in Aristotle’s terms, the endoxa) for reconsidering Aristotle is 
probably better now than it has been for many centuries, precisely because of its 
contentiousness. This is disciplinarity’s saving grace. 
Modem readers of Aristotle must at some point consider whether such a position is 
hopelessly naïve, or whether wε can profit by setting aside thε objectivity question in its 
post-Kuhnian form. 1 think we would do well to set it aside, becausε it results in dogma 
rather than philosophy, but there is no quick demonstration of this. One way of 
defìεnding the reasonableness of Aristotle’s app따ent naïveté is to say that our 0비ectivity 
problem reflects a deep but corrigiblε confusion in modem philosophy itself stretching 
back to Hume and Kant, and that our anxiety about 0비ectivity is a bad mental habit we 
need to bre빼. This is John McDowell ’s argument in Man and World (McDowell 1996). 
McDowell ’s thesis is that the objectivity question is a characteristically modem anxiety 
that calls for exorcism rather than an answer. This anxiety results from the apparent 
impossibility of reconciling two firmly held modem bεliefs: that nature is a system of 
neces f.ity as modem natural science presupposes, and that our thought is fr<∞. Kant 
posεs the problem this way: “ Philosophy must thereforε assume that no true 
contradiction will be found between freεdom and natural necεssity in the very same 
human actions , for it cannot give up the concept of naturε any more that that of 
freedom" (GMM, 60). Kant’s solution is to separate human rationality and freedom from 
nature, by claiming that there must be essentially two distinct rεalms of being or realty, a 
realm of freεdom and a realm of nεcessity. A more plausiblε way of vaulting through 
the homs of Kant’s dilemma, McDowell argues, is to think of nature and especially 
human nature in an Aristotelian way, as potentiality for a particular realization rather 
than as necεssitated motion. 
Can Thomas Kuhn be cited as a witness for the postmodem c1aim that Aristotle’s 
assumption of the possibility of an objective account of the world is mistaken? 
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Misreadings of Kuhn abound, and his text is imprecise enough to accommodate many 
of them. But Kuhn himsεlf never says that science is not an attempt to make sense of 
independently existing nature, so that it is simply a matter of social control over the 
standards of πuth operating at a particular time - power masquerading as truth-seeking 
inquiry which calls for genealogical unmasking and political overthrow nor that all 
inquiry should be organized into clear and discemible disciplines, on the model of 
physics and economics. Kuhn ’s appreciation and critique of the traditional 
understanding of science neither endorses modem science nor exposes it as ideological. 
His position is less dramatic and more compelling, epitornized in the following: ‘'There 
are losses as well as gains in scientific revolutions, and scientists tend to be particularly 
blind to the former" (Kuhn 1970, 167). Note that his main interest was in showing that it 
is important to read non-modem scientific work from the inside, as it were, trying to 
understand it as the authors did, rather than as a step on the way toward tmth. It is 
notable that Kuhn ’s ftrst sense of this came when he realized that Aristotle’s discussion 
of motion and matter in the Physics was not, as he at first thought it was, “ full of 
egregious errors, both of 10gic and of observation." By understanding that what Aristotle 
meant by the terms matter and motion was very different from what Galileo, Newton, 
and their successors meant by them, he achieved the central historicizing insight of his 
book about scientific revolutions: “My jaw droppεd， for all at oncε Aristotlε sεemed a 
very good physicist indeed, but of a sort 1’ d never dreamed possible .... Statements that 
had previously seemed egregious rnistakes, now seemed at worse near rnisses within a 
powerful and genera1Jy successful tradition"(Kuhn 2000, 16-17). 
Along with this preoccupation (verging on obsession) with the problem of certainty, 
modεm social science is concemed to εxcess with the problem of precision. According 
to the standard paradigm of modem natural science and of the social sciences that wish 
to approximate it, no proposition can be held meaningful (either true or false) unless it 
spe1Js out how its claim can be measured with precision. This privileges mathematical 
formulations over vεrbal ones , since thε lattεr inevitably involvε ambiguity and 
imprecision. The difficulty with this theoretical comrnitment is that it im 
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concemed with precision than with accuracy.13) It mles out the possibility that there are 
some things in the world - for examplε human virtuεs and human flourishing - that 
are knowable and expressible , but only in terms that recognize and signify the 
imprecision of our knowledge of these things. Denying this mns against Aristotle ’s 
much quoted but usually misunderstood c1aim in the NE that there are certain matters 
that must be spoken of imprecisely, inc1uding the subject matter of social science, the 
specifically human goods and how they are best achieved. 14) 
Sen’s Aristotelian eudaimonism has two key aspects. The first is his c1aim that a good 
life cannot be reduced to a single good condition or precondition (such as utility or 
wealth) that inc1udes all other goods - Sen refers to this as the “constitutive plurality" 
of human capabilities and functionings. This means that the variety of human 
functionings is such that they cannot be expressεd by a single metric or ranking, so that 
there will a1ways be cases in which various goods are at odds with one another. The 
second is his argument that given constitutive plurality, policy analysis cannot be as 
prε:cise as mathematics without distorting its subject matter - without either neglecting 
the problem of human flourishing or denying the essential plurality of the goods that 
constitute f10urishing activity for us. Mainstrεam economics cannot well answer 
questions about well-being because it tries to answer them too precisely. By conc1uding 
that quantitative models are always better representations of reality than ambiguous 
words, economists and others forec1ose the possibility of thinking about just what we 
want our numbers and models to mean and to do. lt is sadly true that most economists 
see what Sen is doing as something called philosophy, and thus of no interest to them. 15) 
13) Sen is perhaps the most clearly Neo-Aristotelian of empirical social scientists. His very Aristotelian 
approach to the problem of political development is set out in Sen 1999. Others who should be 
mentioned in this connection are the political scientist James Scott (Seeing Like A State: How 
Certain Schemes To Improve the Human Condition Havε Failed) and the urbanist Bent Flyvbjerg 
(Making Socia! Science Matter: Why Soci“llnquiη Fa i/s μnd How It Can Succeed Again). 
14) “ Every account (logos) concerning how we must act has to be stated in outline and not with 
precision, just as we said at the start that we should demand accounts (/OfWi) that are appropriate to 
the su비ect matter, and matters conceming actions and what is in our interest have nothing íìxed 
about them, just likε matters of health" (Nic Eth 2, 11 04al-5). 
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In the end, the problem with both interpretive and variable-centered social science 
taken as hegemonic and exclusive paradigms is that in their unmodified and imperialist 
form they are bad science - they r，εly on models of the world that distort too much 
about human action and that conceal their own distortion. Interpretive sciencε 
presupposes that the world is divided into cu1tures, which it bεcomes the job of the 
scientist to discover and articulate. 、Tariable- or “data" -centered social science depends 
on the notion that emergent phenomena can be explained by the same hypothesis-testing 
procedures successfully used by physicists. This is not to say that therε is any approach 
that serves up direct access to human affairs on a silver platter; any approach is theory-
laden, making initial presuppositions about the character of what we study. The problem 
with the interpretivist’s “cu1ture" is that it severs the human from the natural;16l the 
problem with the behavioralist’s “ data" is the opposite: it conflates simple and emergent 
phenomena. What is required is a 1εss distorting and less self-concealing view of the 
world. 1 think something like that is implicit in the approach toward nature and action to 
be found in Aristotle; but my more general point is that we will better employ whatever 
models or paradigms we use in political analysis if we are aware of the theorεtical 
15) Nussbaum comments on this difficulty in reference to the conferences she and Sen ran from 1987 to 
1993 for the World Institute of Dεve10pment Economics Research (WIDER): “ Given the public 
dominance of economics, any profession that cannot get itself taken seriously by it will have tough 
going. But economics is extremely self-satisfied, and its tendency to repudiate nonformal and 
foundational work as irrelevant to its concems poses a major problem" (Nussbaum 1998, 778). 
16) On the trouble with the exaggerated emphasis on the terrn culture, the literary critic Lewis Menand 
says this: “ At a time when it has become common to say that changing our world begins with 
changing our culture, and when many people are eager to tell other people what sort of culture is 
right for them and what sort is wrong for thεm， it might bε suggested that thε rεal source of human 
change lies not in the culture or in the theoretical de‘criptions we propose for it, but in the mysteries 
ofperson띠ity ， which are a scandal to theory. 1 don’t think 1 know what culture is. It has become a 
terrn like the terrn “ether" in nineteenth-century science; it is the necessary medium for explaining 
why everything else doεs what it doεs. But whatever culture is, 1 do not think it is synonymous with 
human agency" (Dickstein 1998, 368-369). 1 suggest that the reason for the immense popularity of 
“ culture" is that it gives us a sense of power over the world of ideas and practices, similar to the 
sense of power produced by Hobbesian reduction of action to response 
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alternatives , if wε participate in the conversation that is thε history of political 
philosophy. It is a bitter irony that Thomas Kuhn, who intended his study of scientific 
revolutions as a way of making scientists more self-conscious about what they were 
doing, has been the man in whose name advocates for restricting self-consciousness to 
clear allegiance to a paradigm have waged a largely successful battle against 
philosophical self-consciousness. 까lÌs was not Kuhn’s intent, but it has been a major 
consequence of his work, especially in the social sciences, hungry for the power that 
seems to come in academia and in society generalJy from acting like a real science. 
The Neo-Aristotelian approach to political reality rejects the explicitly modemist 
Weberian idea that politics or the state is defined as “ a human community that 
(succe얹ssfu삐111ψy) c이la없ims the monopoly ~까!γγf、 t.μhe legitimate use ()f까phys되ical force within a given 
territory. ,, 17) From an Aristotelian point of view, this is a necess따y but by no means 
sufficiεnt or constitutivε characterization of a political community “Legitimacy" for 
Webεr means that the citizens or subjects of a state freely consent to the exεrcise of state 
powerto εnforce its commands; the power of the state must bε supported by the consent 
of thε govemed to count as political rule. For Aristotlε ， such a community should 
instead be thought of as a kind of giant household, or, if the consent of the ruled is 
obtained by deceit, as a kind of despotism or tyranny. For politics to exist, three 
additional elements must also bε presεnt. Thε first is that binding community decisions 
must be made with an awarεness of shared nomoi , laws or customs , written or 
unwritten, that have two features: the nomoi must have authority independent of the 
decision of any individual or group, and the nomoi must be seen as criticizable and 
revisable, rather than absolute and unchangeable. As in many Aristotelian formulations, 
the idea is to avoid two undesirable extremes: treating laws as mere exercises in poweζ 
and treating the laws as etemal commands. Thε idea is that genuine political lifìε cannot 
exist if the endoxa or the culture of a political community is dominated by either 
relativism or absolutism. The second element beyond consent required for politics is that 
the laws must aim at the promotion of some plausible conception of human flourishing 
17) "Politics as a Vocation," in Gerth and Mills 1958, 78. 
Neo-Aristotelianism in Contemporary Political Studies 243 
(eudaimonia). If the nomoi of a society function only to protect individual rights or to 
secure intemal and extemal peace and material prosperity, the community still falls short 
of a fully political existence. The third and final element that makεs up a political 
community is citizen participation in ruling as well as being ruled. This can be satisfied 
in a variety of ways. In his discussion of “polity," the best practicable regime, in Books 
4-6 of the Politics, Aristotle argues that it is not necessary for the bulk of the citizens to 
hold high legislative or executive office so long as all exercise the right to act as judges 
or jurors in trials, to participate in electing officials, and to serve on boards that audit and 
scrutinize the performance of these elected officials once they have left office. 
The work of social sciεnce is to illuminate that universal or natural set of problems 
and questions about the relationship between political and other forms of sociallife on 
the one hand, and human tlourishing on the other, whether by predictive variable-
centered studies that abstract from the ways in which political actors understand 
themselves, by more discursive and closer to practice historical-interpretive studies, by 
combining these approaches, or by some other way entirely. The problem with the two 
modemisms is that they restrict inquiry arbitrarily to one approach or another; the 
problem with postmodemism is that it fails to take the problem of objectivity seriously 
enough, and so too quickly throws the baby out with the bathwater. 
Aristotle has an apt phrase for what 1 suggest doing here. In onε of his two books of 
political science (he calls what he is doing politikê) he refers to the need for “ saving the 
appearances," by which he means saving the prevailing endoxa as much as possible 
This is done not by accepting or rejecting them simply, but by using these existing 
approaches, pointing out their deficiεnClεs and pεrplexities ， and proposing a more 
universal framework within which they may bε bεtter understood and employed. 18) 
18) Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145b 2-7: “ One must here, as in other cases, when one has set out the 
appearances and gone through their perplexities, bring to light in that way all the reputable opi띠ons 
(eru1oxa) about these experiences, and if not all of them at least the most authoritativε onεs. For ifthε 
difficulties are unraveled and something is left of the endoxa, it will have been made evident in 때 
adequate way." 끼lis is my revision of the translation by Joe Sacks, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics 
(Sacks 2(02). 
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Aristot1e’s advice here seems especially appropriate for political theorists within the 
modern day discipline of Political Science. Political Science is unique among the 
contemporary social sciencεs in that, for a variety of hard to sort out motives, it has 
retained political theory or philosophy as an active sub-field, even though it has no 
direct connection to empirical work of either the variable centered or interpretive kind. 
The work of academic political philosophy today, as 1 understand it, is to draw attention 
to the connection between empirical science and contemporary political life on the one 
hand, and, on the other, the relatively perm뻐ent and universal questions that come to 
light in the conversations we political theorists create among the texts that constitute the 
traditions (plural) of political philosophy. Our particular job is to keep those 
conversations alive and by doing so to clarify and inspire both political action and 
political science.19l 
Such an approach might even give rise to a new post-paradigmatic idea of 
disciplinary rigor, one that looks like this: a truly rigorous social science recognizes that 
any choices we make about the character of political reality should be informed by an 
awareness of the background debate over that question, not only in works of social 
science proper but in the philosophical arguments that underliε the social scientific 
explorations of events and institutions in the light of partly overlapping and partly 
clashing views about what politics is and is for. To paraphrase the greatest European 
philosopher20l of the “ second wave" of modernity for my own Neo-Aristotelian 
purposεs: Philosophy without social science is, from the pεrspec디ve of action at least, 
19) David Mayhew, a prominent and philosophically well infonned student of American politics, argues 
for a role much like this one in his incisive and valuable essay “ Political Science and Political 
Philosophy: Ontological Not Nonnative" (Mayhεw 2000, 192-193). Mayhew arguεs against the 
positivist view that p이itical philosophy deals with “ nonns" or ideals rather than p이itical realities. 
lnstead, he argues, the contribution of political philosophy to empirical social scien∞ is to keep alive 
a set 01' fundamental altematives about the meaning and significance of political reality, altematives 
sεt out in different ways by philosophers who attempt to speak of politics universally and 
。이ectively. 
20) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B75: “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without 
concepts are blind." 
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empty; from the same perspective, social science without philosophy is blind. 
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